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Review by Stella Krepp, University of Bern 
]nly diplomatic historians could reduce the Latin American Cold War to a Cuban beach” Greg 
Grandin lamented in 2007 and urged historians to counter the ‘crisis-driven narrative’ of U.S.-
Latin American relations, which depicted the history of the region as a succession of wars and 
conflicts, yet failed to examine peaceful periods and long-term processes.1 Since then, outstanding new studies 
on inter-American relations redefining the Latin American Cold War have been published, yet Venezuela has 
until now escaped the attention of historians.2  
Aragorn Storm Miller’s Precarious Paths to Freedom delivers a timely response to these calls. Miller traces 
Venezuelan history in what he refers to as an outstanding democratic decade from 1958 to 1968. Examining 
the relationship between the United States and Venezuela, he argues for an “apparent case of Venezuelan 
exceptionalism in the otherwise gloomy story of the Cold War” (218), arguing that the presidencies of 
Rómulo Betancourt, Raúl Leoni, and Rafael Caldera and their Punto Fijo coalition were a triumph of 
democracy, aided and bolstered by the United States. Yet Miller also provides a detailed story of the internal 
upheavals of Venezuela. In rich detail, he recounts how Betancourt and later Leoni outmaneuvered the armed 
left in Venezuela, thwarted attempts by the Dominican President Rafael Trujillo and the Cuban leader Fidel 
Castro to intervene, and successfully consolidated Venezuelan democracy.  
Miller’s central argument, however, is that the “Caracas-Washington axis would be the key force for moderate 
democratic capitalism” (34) in the region and a linchpin of U.S. Caribbean policy, particularly in regards to 
the Dominican Republic and Cuba. Miller offers his most compelling story when recounting the entangled 
history of Cuba, Venezuela, and the greater Caribbean for which the historian Stephen Rabe coined the term 
“Caribbean triangle.”3 Venezuela was central in condemning both the Dominican Republic and Cuba in the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and a strategic partner in dealing with threats to political stability in 
the Caribbean. Although the Eisenhower administration had originally supported Trujillo, by 1959 he had 
become a political liability. With his mercurial personality and constant meddling in the political affairs of his 
country’s neighbors, he threatened to become a destabilizing force in the Caribbean. In turn, he positioned 
himself in direct opposition to moderate democratic leaders in the region, particularly Venezuela’s President 
Rómulo Betancourt. Trujillo’s personal vendetta against Betancourt reached its climax in 1960, when it 
transpired that Trujillo had not only mounted a political campaign against Betancourt, but was implicated in 
an assassination attempt that left Betancourt severely injured. The Venezuelan government requested an 
investigation of the affair by the Organization of American States, which promptly condemned Trujillo for 
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violating inter-American rules. By August 26 of that year, the United States and all Latin American countries 
had severed diplomatic ties with the Dominican Republic. 
Miller chronicles how Venezuela also cooperated with the United States in countering Castro and his support 
of armed struggle in the region. Betancourt was the central figure in rallying support for the exclusion of the 
Castro regime from the OAS in 1962 and in demanding further sanctions. In late 1963, after discovering an 
arms cache of Cuban provenance on Venezuelan ground, the Betancourt government approached the OAS 
again, charging that Cuba had aided and financed revolutionary groups in Venezuela. After a report that 
substantiated the charges that Cuba had sponsored actions to overthrow the Venezuelan government, the 
OAS imposed economic and political sanctions in July 1964.  
One of the most fascinating accounts that Miller offers is the story of the short-lived rapprochement between 
Trujillo and Castro in late 1960 and early 1961 that U.S. officials stylized as a “Hitler-Stalin type of 
cooperation” (60). Since the Cuban relationship with the U.S. was souring, it underscored the oftentimes 
pragmatic politics of many Latin American governments that defied Cold War imperatives. 
Despite such praise, I do have some criticism and quibbles. As mentioned in the book’s introduction, the 
author was unable to gain access to Venezuelan archives. He consequently bases his study on U.S. documents, 
and, to a lesser extent, on Dominican sources, as well as Venezuelan periodicals and a small selection of edited 
interviews and public statements. This is unfortunate, because the over-reliance on U.S. sources shows in the 
overall analysis. Despite Miller’s best intentions to reinstate Latin American agency, by not using Venezuelan 
sources he ultimately fails to give Venezuelans a voice. In practical terms, this means there is little in-depth 
discussion of what the Venezuelans wanted and how that differed from or approximated U.S. wishes. Just 
because superficial political interests in the Caribbean often aligned does not necessarily mean that the 
underlying motives also coincided.  
This is perhaps most acute in Miller’s claims of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Venezuela. Yet, apart from 
showing that there were links, it remains unclear to what extent and in what ways Castro’s Cuba supported 
violent struggles in Venezuela. This is important because the question of impact and causality is crucial for 
establishing agency. In sum, did Cuban involvement constitute an actual threat or did the Betancourt 
government exaggerate the Cuban involvement for its own purposes? Miller hints at this in his introduction 
when he explains that “Venezuelan moderates…dexterously exploited US support” (xi) but his book 
ultimately cannot adequately address this point with the available evidence.  
The study would also have benefitted from a broader Latin American contextualization, particularly to 
underline the author’s argument of Venezuelan exceptionalism. Many of the issues Venezuela faced–the 
radicalization of politics, the rise of the armed left, the question of development and democracy−were region-
wide phenomena and a comparative perspective would have helped Miller to carve out why and how the 
Venezuelan path diverged. Without wanting to fall into the trap of suggesting a different book than the 
author has written, neighboring Colombia might have been an illuminating example as it experienced similar 
obstacles, but ultimately followed a distinct path.  
Miller’s main theme is the “U.S.-Venezuelan effort to simultaneously consolidate democracy and 
modernization” (217). While he acknowledges that Washington soon privileged political stability over 
democracy in the rest of the hemisphere, he argues that Washington’s commitment to Venezuelan democracy 
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did not waver. However, I am not entirely convinced that democracy was such a crucial factor in U.S.-
Venezuelan relation for several reasons. 
First, Miller portrays Betancourt as a “leading visionary of Latin American societal reform and 
democratization” (14), but here he advances a fairly narrow interpretation of what constitutes democracy. 
Miller’s assessment of the Punto Fijo coalition as the first Venezuelan democratic government seems 
somewhat surprising. Skimming over the democratic trienio period from 1945 to 1948, in what Leslie Bethell 
and Ian Roxborough have defined as a first wave of democratization in Latin America, it is maybe not as 
much of a rupture as Miller would like us to believe.4 Even though for Venezuelans the transition towards 
democracy was certainly a transformative experience, it is important to note that this was a limited democracy 
with restricted democratic competition. And whether justified or not, Betancourt suspended the constitution, 
outlawed political parties and did not hesitate to use police and the armed forces to repress the radical left. 
Pledging democratic values and staging free elections are not the same as democratic rule, as the case of the 
current Venezuelan government painfully demonstrates. 
Second, there has been a long-standing dispute over whether or not there was a genuine effort in the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations to further democracy in the region. Scholars such as Thomas Field Jr. have 
argued that the John F. Kennedy government and its ‘Alliance for Progress’ fueled authoritarianism and 
ultimately laid the foundation for military dictatorship in Bolivia.5 Others, such as Philip E. Muehlenbeck 
and Robert B. Rakove, have forwarded a more nuanced critique claiming that the Kennedy administration 
sought to nurture nationalist, anti-communist regimes with democratic tendencies in the Third World.6 Yet 
the key word here seems to be anti-Communist. As Stephen Rabe has convincingly argued, for Washington 
democracy came a distant second to anticommunism in its search for strategic partners within the 
hemisphere.7 Overall, more engagement with the literature and the new Latin American Cold War history, 
such as Tanya Harmer’s work, would have strengthened and helped situate Miller’s arguments.8 
As a case in point, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ actions towards other democratic governments 
in the region speak a very different language. In Brazil, Alliance funds were channeled to the state governors 
directly, in an attempt to destabilize the Goulart government, because Washington accused him of left-
leaning tendencies and being soft on Communists. Maybe more importantly, Brazilian Presidents Jânio                                                         
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Quadros and João Goulart adopted a more independent foreign policy, something quite unpalatable to the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Ultimately, perhaps Venezuela was not more democratic than other 
governments in say Brazil or Chile, but Betancourt and his successors were undoubtedly more manageable 
than other democratic leaders in Latin America.  
In a similar vein, Miller casts the Venezuelan inter-American policies against both Trujillo and Castro as a 
triumph of democratic values. However, Latin American support for the OAS sanctions against Trujillo and 
later Castro were less about the nature of their governments and more about their sponsoring of subversion 
and interference in neighboring countries, a violation of the sacrosanct non-intervention rule. One wonders if 
that was the reason for the Venezuela government as well. Ultimately, would Betancourt have moved against 
Castro if he had not supported the armed left in Venezuela? The answer is probably not.  
Despite these drawbacks, this is rich study of a fundamentally important decade in Latin America that will 
help scholars to understand the complexity of Venezuelan domestic and foreign politics. With his study, 
Miller underscores the importance of the multilateral dimension of U.S.-Latin American relations that is often 
so difficult to engage with. 
 
